

LOGIC EXERCISES

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SS 2021

EXERCISE SHEET 10

18.06.2021

**Exercise 10.1.**     $[\exists^*\forall^*$  with Equality]

Show that unsatisfiability of formulas from the  $\exists^*\forall^*$  fragment with equality is decidable.

**Solution:**

Applying the reduction of equality to non-equality from the lecture only inserts some (isolated)  $\forall$ -quantifiers, thus preserving the  $\exists^*\forall^*$ -fragment.

**Exercise 10.2.**     $[\exists^*\forall^2\exists^*]$

Show how to reduce deciding unsatisfiability of formulas from the  $\exists^*\forall^2\exists^*$ -fragment to deciding unsatisfiability of formulas from the  $\forall^2\exists^*$ -fragment.

**Solution:**

Using skolemization for the outer existential quantifiers preserves satisfiability, and replaces variables by skolem constants, i.e., introduces no function symbols of arity  $> 0$ . The resulting formula is obviously in the  $\forall^2\exists^*$ -fragment.

**Exercise 10.3.**    [Sequent Calculus]

Prove the following formulas in sequent calculus:

1.  $\neg\exists xP(x) \rightarrow \forall x\neg P(x)$
2.  $(\forall x(P \vee Q(x))) \rightarrow (P \vee \forall xQ(x))$

**Solution:**

1.

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{P(y) \Rightarrow \exists xP(x), P(y)}{\Rightarrow P(y), \exists xP(x), \neg P(y)} \neg R}{\Rightarrow \exists xP(x), \neg P(y)} \exists R}{\Rightarrow \exists xP(x), \forall x\neg P(x)} \forall R}{\neg\exists xP(x) \Rightarrow \forall x\neg P(x)} \neg L}{\neg\exists xP(x) \rightarrow \forall x\neg P(x)} \rightarrow R$$

2.

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{\frac{(\forall x(P \vee Q(x))), P \Rightarrow P, Q(x)}{Ax} \quad \frac{(\forall x(P \vee Q(x))), Q(x) \Rightarrow P, Q(x)}{Ax}}{(\forall x(P \vee Q(x))), (P \vee Q(x)) \Rightarrow P, Q(x)} \vee L}{\forall x(P \vee Q(x)) \Rightarrow P, Q(x)} \forall L}{\forall x(P \vee Q(x)) \Rightarrow P, \forall xQ(x)} \forall R}{\forall x(P \vee Q(x)) \Rightarrow P \vee \forall xQ(x)} \forall R}{\Rightarrow (\forall x(P \vee Q(x))) \rightarrow (P \vee \forall xQ(x))} \Rightarrow R$$

**Exercise 10.4. [Can't Touch This]**

Let  $\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}$  be structures over the same language with universes  $A$  and  $B$ , respectively. We say that  $\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}$  are *isomorphic* if there is a bijection  $i : A \rightarrow B$  which preserves the interpretation of all symbols, that is:

1.  $i(c^{\mathcal{A}}) = c^{\mathcal{B}}$ , for all constants  $c$
2.  $i(f^{\mathcal{A}}(a_1, \dots, a_n)) = f^{\mathcal{B}}(i(a_1), \dots, i(a_n))$ , for all functions  $f$  and  $a_1, \dots, a_n \in A$
3.  $P^{\mathcal{A}}(a_1, \dots, a_n) \iff P^{\mathcal{B}}(i(a_1), \dots, i(a_n))$ , for all predicates  $P$  and  $a_1, \dots, a_n \in A$

Let  $\mathcal{N}$  be the standard model of the natural numbers. Assume you are given a countable first-order axiomatisation  $T$  of  $\mathcal{N}$ . Show that there is another model  $\mathcal{N}'$  of  $T$  that is not isomorphic to  $\mathcal{N}$ .

**Solution:**

Let  $c$  be a fresh constant. Consider the theory  $T' := T \cup \{c \neq n \mid n \in \mathbb{N}\}$ . Intuitively,  $c$  denotes an element that is different from all natural numbers. Note that  $T'$  is countable.

We now apply compactness: Take a finite subset  $S$  of  $T'$ .  $S$  contains only finitely many sentences of the shape  $c \neq n$ . Let  $m := 1 + \max\{n \mid n = 0 \vee (c \neq n) \in S\}$ . Extend  $\mathcal{N}$  by adding the constant  $c$  and interpret it by  $m$ . Then  $\mathcal{N} \models S$ .

Hence, by the compactness theorem, there is  $\mathcal{N}'$  with  $\mathcal{N}' \models T'$ . Thus,  $\mathcal{N}' \models T$  but  $\mathcal{N}'$  contains an element  $c^{\mathcal{N}'}$  that is different from all natural numbers and hence cannot be isomorphic to  $\mathcal{N}$ .

To see that  $\mathcal{N}'$  is not isomorphic to  $\mathcal{N}$  more formally, assume there is an isomorphism  $i$  from  $\mathcal{N}'$  to  $\mathcal{N}$ . Let  $n := i(c^{\mathcal{N}'}) \in \mathcal{U}^{\mathcal{N}}$ . Then  $c^{\mathcal{N}'} = n^{\mathcal{N}'} \stackrel{i \text{ is iso.}}{\iff} i(c^{\mathcal{N}'}) = i(n^{\mathcal{N}'}) \iff n = i(n^{\mathcal{N}'}) \stackrel{i \text{ is iso.}}{\iff} n = n$ . However,  $c^{\mathcal{N}'} = n^{\mathcal{N}'}$  is false and  $n = n$  true, contradiction.

**Homework 10.1.** [FOL without Function Symbols] (+++)

Describe an algorithm that transforms any formula  $F$  (in FOL with equality) into an equisatisfiable formula  $F'$  (in FOL with equality) that does not use function symbols. Do not forget to deal with constants, i.e. functions with arity 0.

Apply your algorithm to the formula  $F := \forall xy. R(f(x, y)) \wedge P(c, g(f(x, y)))$ .

**Solution:**

Idea: functions can be modelled as relations satisfying some additional properties (totality + right-uniqueness).

1. For any function  $f/n$ , introduce a fresh predicate  $P_f$  of arity  $n + 1$ .
2. Add the following conjunct for each new predicate:  $\forall x_1 \cdots x_n. \exists y (P_f(x_1, \dots, x_n, y) \wedge \forall z. (P_f(x_1, \dots, x_n, z) \rightarrow y = z))$
3. Iteratively replace all innermost occurrences of  $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  in  $F$  by some new, universally bound variable  $z$  and add the conjunct  $U(x_1, \dots, x_n, z)$ .

Example, step by step, excluding the new predicates' conjuncts:

1.  $\forall x, y, z_1. (R(f(x, y)) \wedge P(z_1, g(f(x, y))) \wedge P_c(z_1))$
2.  $\forall x, y, z_1, z_2. (R(z_2) \wedge P(z_1, g(z_2)) \wedge P_c(z_1) \wedge P_f(x, y, z_2))$
3.  $\forall x, y, z_1, z_2, z_3. (R(z_2) \wedge P(z_1, z_3) \wedge P_c(z_1) \wedge P_f(x, y, z_2) \wedge P_g(z_2, z_3))$

Clearly, by interpreting each  $P_f$  by  $P_f := \{(e_1, \dots, e_n, e) \mid f(e_1, \dots, e_n) = e\}$ , each model of  $F$  can be transformed to a model of  $F'$ . Conversely, if  $F'$  has a model, then each  $P_f$  can be used to interpret the function  $f$ , allowing us to construct a model for  $F$ .

**Homework 10.2.** [Undefinability of Finiteness] (++)

In the following, given a structure  $\mathcal{A}$ , we write  $A := U^{\mathcal{A}}$ .

1. Give a countable set of sentences  $S_I$  such that for any structure  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\mathcal{A} \models S_I$  if and only if  $A$  has infinitely many elements.
2. Show that there cannot be a countable set of sentences  $S_F$  such that for any structure  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\mathcal{A} \models S_F$  if and only if  $A$  has finitely many elements.

**Solution:**

1. Let  $F_n := \exists x_1, \dots, x_n. \bigwedge_{1 \leq i < j \leq n} x_i \neq x_j$  and  $S_I := \{F_n \mid n \in \mathbb{N}_+\}$ . If  $A$  is infinite, then  $\mathcal{A} \models F_n$  for each  $n$  and hence  $\mathcal{A} \models S_I$ . If  $|A| := n \in \mathbb{N}_+$ , then  $\mathcal{A} \not\models F_{n+1}$  and hence  $\mathcal{A} \not\models S_I$ .
2. Assume there is such a set  $S_F$ . Consider the set  $S := S_F \cup S_I$ . Take a finite subset  $T \subset S$ . Let  $m := \max\{n \mid n = 1 \vee F_n \in T\}$ . Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be an arbitrary structure for  $S_F$  of size greater than  $m$ . Then  $\mathcal{A} \models F_i$  for all  $1 \leq i \leq m$  and  $\mathcal{A} \models S_F$ . Hence,  $\mathcal{A} \models T$ . Thus, by compactness,  $S$  has a model  $\mathcal{M}$ . Then  $\mathcal{M} \models S_F$  and hence  $U^{\mathcal{M}}$  is finite by assumption, but also  $\mathcal{M} \models S_I$  and hence  $U^{\mathcal{M}}$  is infinite by the previous exercise. Contradiction!

**Homework 10.3.** [Sequent Calculus] (++)

Prove the following statements using sequent calculus if they are valid, or give a countermodel otherwise.

1.  $\neg\forall x\exists y\forall z(\neg P(x, z) \wedge P(z, y))$
2.  $\forall x\forall y\forall z(P(x, x) \wedge (P(x, y) \wedge P(y, z) \rightarrow P(x, z)))$

**Homework 10.4.** [Miniscoping] (++)

In the lecture, we proved that deciding unsatisfiability of monadic FOL formulas can be reduced to deciding unsatisfiability of formulas from the  $\exists^*\forall^*$  fragment by using miniscoping.

Prove the lemma that after miniscoping, no nested quantifiers remain.

**Solution:**

We prove by induction on the structure of the formula that after miniscoping, for each subformula of the form  $Qx.F$ ,  $F$  is a disjunction of literals if  $Q = \forall$  and conjunction of literals if  $Q = \exists$  and each literal contains  $x$  free.

The only interesting cases are the quantifier cases. Assume we have a formula of the form  $\exists xF$  such that no miniscoping rules are applicable. By the induction hypothesis, below all quantifiers in  $F$ , there are only disjunctions/conjunctions of literals containing the bound variable.

As no miniscoping rules are applicable,  $F$  must be a conjunction of literals and quantified formulas such that each conjunct contains  $x$  free. So assume  $F$  contains a quantified formula, that is  $F = \dots \wedge Qy.F' \wedge \dots$ . By the induction hypothesis,  $F'$  is a disjunction/conjunction of literals, each literal containing  $y$  free. However, as we are in the monadic fragment, a literal can contain at most one free variable. Thus,  $F'$  cannot contain  $x$  free, which is a contradiction to  $F$  containing quantifiers. Thus,  $F$  only contains literals and hence has the desired shape.

The case for  $\forall xF$  is similar.

Logic is in the eye of the logician.

— Gloria Steinem